The political and policy impacts of alternative governing arrangements are an enduring and important puzzle of urban politics. Locating the source of the empirical confusion over structural effects in the use of static data analysis, the author emphasizes the benefits of investigating the substantive consequences of identifiable events (e.g., changes in form of government, budgeting techniques, the election of a minority mayor) via dynamic multiwave panel data and appropriate estimation techniques. This point is illustrated by analyzing the fiscal effects of reformism in a panel of 222 cities . Findings suggest no more than transient decreases in per-capita city expenditures postadoption of council-manager government.
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Four decades of inquiry notwithstanding, empirical consensus on when institutions matter, if they do, is markedly absent from the literature. In fact, most recent research on the subject fails to discern any institutional effects whatsoever (see Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Greene 2000; Farnham 1990 ). What accounts for this disconnect between theory and empirics? In this article, I suggest that the static research designs and analytic methodologies used thus far prevent us from testing adequately for the existence (or lack) of institutional effects.
2 Specifically, I outline a dynamic approach to assessing empirically differences between "reformed" and "unreformed" governments. 3 Dynamic analysis requires the use of panel data-data sets that contain information on a large number of cities observed over a long period-and estimation techniques that take the panel nature of the data into account.
Upon applying such a research design to the question of city spending, I find that on average per-capita city expenditures decrease when the municipality replaces the mayor-council form of government with council-manager government. As I subsequently demonstrate, however, failure to take the temporal nature of the substantive process into account when modeling hypothesized institutional impacts generates the paradoxical result often reported in the literature: council-manager cities spend more than their mayor-council counterparts do. My analysis also uncovers novel long-term effects of institutional changes. Specifically, I find the decreased spending that follows the adoption of council-manager government to be short lived; per-capita expenditure flows revert to their prechange patterns a few years following institutional change.
Although I restrict the substantive application of my analytic framework to the relationship between a city's form of government and fiscal flows, the research design and estimation strategies I outline are applicable to the exploration of a diverse set of questions. For example, does the election of minority mayors influence the general pattern of policy priorities (Pelissero, Holian, and Tomaka 2000) ? Does economic development policy influence local economic growth (Feiock 1991) ? Do urban riots influence urban expenditures (Welch 1975)? In the sections that follow, I first review empirical studies central to the reformism debate. Because the primary hypotheses are well known to students of urban politics, I neither review nor critically evaluate the theoretical arguments that color this debate. Rather, I focus the discussion on methodological issues pertaining to data requirements, issues that include testing for an array of possible institutional effects (for example, effects that manifest themselves after a lag of several years, effects that reverse themselves over time, and so forth), and issues relevant for choosing between competing empirical models (fixed-effects versus random-effects models). Thereafter, I outline my research design and analytic strategy and subsequently my empirical findings. I conclude by reiterating the relevance of the methodology I employ not only for the reformism debate per se but also for the empirical study of urban politics and public policy more generally.
LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE SUBSTANTIVE SETTING
Contemporary urban politics scholarship reflects an enduring interest in understanding the relationship between cities' governing institutions and urban public policy (Brown and Halaby 1984; Clingermayer and Feiock 2001; Farnham 1990 Farnham , 1987 Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Lyons 1978; Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Nunn 1996; Rauch 1995; Rubin 1988; Sharp 1986; Welch 1975; Wolman, Strate, and Melchior 1996) . Scholars working in this intellectual vein owe a significant intellectual debt to Lineberry and Fowler's (1967) seminal findings suggestive of significant behavioral differences between reformed and unreformed governments "even if the socioeconomic composition of their population may be similar" (p. 703; emphasis added). The definition of reformed and unreformed governments will be familiar to urban researchers. By reformed governments, Lineberry and Fowler meant nothing more than cities that had either the commission or the council-manager form of government and/or nonpartisan, at-large elections, whereas unreformed cities are cities relying upon partisan, ward-based elections and the mayor-council form of government.
4
In a random sample of 200 of the 309 largest cities in 1960 and bivariate tests of the relationship between cities' social class and ethnicity and form of government, Lineberry and Fowler (1967) found reformed cities to be more likely to tax and spend less than unreformed cities because, as they argued, reformed cities respond less to social cleavages (see also Clark 1968; Karnig 1975; and Northrup and Dutton 1978) . Because these initial queries relied on cross-sectional data and simple correlations, they could neither establish causal relations nor identify dynamic causal effects. However, Lyons's (1978) analysis of change scores (measuring change in per-capita expenditure between 1960 and 1970) for a sample of almost 250 cities generally supported Lineberry and Fowler's claims. Yet, empirical research has also yielded contrary evidence. For instance, in their analysis of the fiscal trends of 30 large cities over the 1890 to 1940 period, Brown and Halaby (1984) found reform led to increased general expenditures.
An equally impressive array of research supports the null hypothesis of no institutional effects (see, for example, Deno and Mehay 1987; Farnham 1990; Hayes and Chang 1990; Morgan and Pelissero 1980) . Morgan and Pelissero (1980) , for instance, employed a variant of the standard BoxJenkins transfer function model to test whether form of government changes (occurring between 1948 and 1973) in 11 of a total of 22 cities influenced city revenues and expenditures and concluded that of 28 tests of the effects of reform, only two structural changes (7 percent) produce the expected modifications in revenue and spending levels. Moreover, just as many significant effects of structural change are in the wrong direction. These findings clearly do not bode well for the theoretical assumptions growing out of the reform literature. (P. 1003; see also Farnham 1990) Could it be, then, that institutions have no significant, measurable bearing on fiscal flows? Is a major theoretical foundation of the reform movement void (Stumm and Corrigan 1998, 344; Pelissero, Holian, and Tomaka 2000) ? Few among us would be willing to abandon faith in urban institutions. Indeed, the recent new-institutional renaissance in political science, sociology, and history suggests anything but that formal institutions do not matter. However, if our conception of the relationship between urban institutions and processes is valid, what explains our failure to document the effects of governing structures on city fiscal behavior?
I suspect that the effects of institutional changes have been difficult to ascertain empirically because the consequences of institutional change manifest themselves with a temporal lag. Thus, unless we observe both the occurrence of institutional change and institutional outputs over an extended period, we may be unable to discern institutional effects. For example, if institutional effects dissipate five years after a city changes its form of government, any study relying on a sample observed only at time t 0 is likely to find erroneous institutional effects if most cities in the sample changed their form of government six or more years preceding t 0 (i.e., at t < t -5 ).
Changes in urban institutions may influence governmental processes and outputs in ways that are more complicated as well. For example, there is no reason to believe that a change in a city's form of government will affect fiscal flows immediately or permanently. Indeed, the impact may be delayed, it may be transitory, or it may even be nonlinear with respect to time. Thus, if we suspect that institutional effects manifest themselves in a particular sequence over time, we must explore these possibilities by explicitly modeling the suspected effects. In sum, it becomes necessary to design our empirical inquiry with an eye on the possibly dynamic nature of the phenomenon at hand. Although in the next section I set forth the basic parameters of the appropriate research design and analytic methodology in the context of exploring the relationship between form of government changes and fiscal flows, the applicability of the basic framework to a large set of substantive inquiries ought to be readily apparent.
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS
In the urban politics literature, analysts have paid considerable attention to documenting the consequences of structural change. For example, some popular lines of inquiry include attempts to discern whether machine-dominated cities spend more than cities where machines were less cohesive and powerful (Brown and Halaby 1984) and whether reformed (commission or councilmanager) cities spend less than unreformed (mayor-council) cities (see, for example, Clark 1968; Dye 1967; Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Lyons 1978; Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Greene 2000) . Unfortunately, that the influences of significant events may unfold in a myriad of temporal patterns is a point unrecognized thus far.
TEMPORAL DYNAMICS: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND SUBSTANTIVE PROCESSES
For instance, assume there is good reason to suspect that a city's expenditure and revenue patterns are disrupted by changes in the form of government employed by the city. Specifically, assume that expenditures decrease following the adoption of the council-manager form of government. Laboring under this assumption, we compile the necessary time series of expenditure data for the city in question, expecting a graph of expenditure trends Y(t) to reflect a disruption in the trend of the series, with the break occurring precisely in the year of structural change (t 0 ) and expenditures subsequently (i.e., for t ≤ t 0 ) increasing (or decreasing). Figure 1 (A) documents this simple additive effect for an increase in expenditures.
Formally, if δ is the impact of the event,
Y it = µ for all t < t 0 , and
where While a statistically significant and positive coefficient on the event indicator (i.e., δ > 0) hints at an increase in the process, a significant albeit negative coefficient (δ < 0) suggests a decrease. Given the tenets of modern social science, our theoretical conceptualizations of substantive processes will a priori dictate whether we ought to expect δ < 0 or δ > 0. In the reformism debates, for example, because theory tells us structural reforms muzzle social cleavages, city expenditures are expected to decrease (i.e., δ < 0) following the adoption of reformed governance structures. Certainly, there is no reason to believe that the impact is immediate, permanent, and linear. For example, Figure 1 (B) depicts a situation wherein the baseline effect of time is linear and the only difference between pre-and postevent expenditure patterns is decreased baseline spending for units experiencing the event, that is, Figure 1 (C) charts a process whose slope and intercept both change:
Figures 1(D) through 1(F) portray scenarios in which the process abruptly decreases following the event but rapidly reverts to prechange levels ( Figure 1D ), decreases slowly for a while but thereafter reverses and steadily returns to prechange levels ( Figure 1E ), and decreases slowly to settle at lower postevent levels ( Figure 1F ). Formally, we may approximate the trajectory mapped in Figure 1 (E) via Y it = µ 0 + µ 1 t + µ 2 t 2 + δ 1 X it + δ 2 X it t + δ 3 X it t 2 ; whereas Figure 1(D) can be modeled via a set of lagged dummy variables to capture the increasing or decreasing effects as in, for example, X 1it = 1 if event occurred immediately prior to t; 0 otherwise. X 2it = 1 if event occurred immediately prior to t -1; 0 otherwise. X 3it = 1 if event occurred immediately prior to t -2; 0 otherwise.
Because Figure 1 (F) suggests a process where the effects manifest themselves over an extended period and do not dissipate rapidly, modeling such a process calls for careful coding of the lagged dummy variables. For instance, if we suspect it takes six time periods before the process settles, we may employ five dummy variables lagged sequentially as in Figure 1 (D) but coding the sixth and final dummy variable as X 6it = 1 if the event occurred at any time prior to t -5 and 0 otherwise. To be sure, although the trajectories charted in Figure 1 are by no means the only theoretical possibilities, they nevertheless capture the general range of possible institutional effects most likely evinced in social science research.
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THE BENEFITS OF PANEL DATA
Recall that the substantive issues motivating this study are questions central to the municipal reformism debate: Does form of government matter? Do reformed cities spend less relative to unreformed cities? Past research on these issues has tended to employ either a static framework and a dichotomous indicator for form of government or a time-serial design of the BoxJenkins variety (see, for example, Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Morgan and Kickham 1999) . Although dynamic effects cannot be tested in the one-time, cross-sectional framework, the Box-Jenkins transfer-function models used by Morgan and Pelissero (1980) and Morgan and Kickham (1999) are designed for reasonably lengthy time series of a single unit (i.e., city, county, state). If the data set comprises periodic observations on multiple units, analytic techniques that take into account the panel nature of the data set are superior to transfer-function models. For example, pooled cross-sectional, time-series analysis techniques enable the modeling of unit-specific effects, as well as various complications that characterize the data (e.g., panel-specific heteroscedasticity, spatial correlation, and so forth). Morgan and Pelissero's (1980) analysis of 22 cities, of which 11 changed their form of government at some point between 1948 and 1970, is illustrative of some of these methodological problems. 5 In their model, it remains unclear how averaging the series for the 22 cities to generate a single series fully adjusts for city-specific effects. In fact, it is clear that averaging across reformed and unreformed cities restricts the ability of city-to-city variation to influence spending patterns. This obviously raises the question of why we should expect spending (on a per-capita basis) in a small, homogenous reformed city to be no different from spending in a large, heterogeneous reformed city. Furthermore, if outliers are present in our data sets, process variances are likely to be inflated while low-order autocorrelation will be understated and transfer function estimates significantly distorted (McCleary and Hay 1980, 199-203) .
Finally, although Morgan and Pelissero's (1980) dynamic analysis is a considerable improvement on the typical static models, the brief time span is nevertheless problematic and for more than the unusually small degrees-offreedom problem. Specifically, although Morgan and Pelissero (p. 1003) report negligible traces of autocorrelation, searching for correlated lag structures in a series of 11 observations is an unreliable diagnostic strategy. In particular, falsely ignoring autocorrelation leads to increased probability of Type II errors: We more often fail to reject the null hypothesis-in this case that reformed and unreformed cities spend alike-when the null hypothesis is false.
In light of these shortcomings in the research designs and analytic techniques used by past researchers studying the consequences of reformism, I employ a research design permitting a fuller analysis of the dynamic impact(s) of institutional change on the expenditure streams of cities. In particular, I rely on a multiwave panel design wherein the panel is a set of 222 cities drawn from the universe of 309 cities that had a population of 30,000 at the time of the 1930 census and that observed over the 1946 to 1966 period. 6 The specific event of interest is a city's adoption of the council-manager form of government in the 1946 to 1966 period. 7 Measuring reformism in this fashion does not explicitly account for the existence of other structural elements commonly deemed reformist (for example, whether the city relies on nonpartisan and/or at-large elections). However, because the period under review spans a time in municipal history when almost without exception council-manager adoptions entailed nonpartisan and at-large elections (see Bryant 1976; Pelissero 1980, 1001) , my preferred event measurement strategy is unlikely to introduce additional noise in the models I estimate. Besides, the council-manager versus mayor-council dichotomy of reformism employed both here and in past research is the only reliable proxy for cities'formal governing structures given its availability over time for most cities.
Of the 222 cities comprising the panel, 42 cities (19%) adopted councilmanager government over the period 1946 to 1966. Cities are coded as experiencing the event-council manager = 1; otherwise 0-in the year councilmanager government goes into effect. Of the four fiscal series commonly employed as the dependent variable of interest in the literature-total general city expenditures, total net long-term debt, total city revenues, and total city intergovernmental aid (see, for example, Brown and Halaby 1984; Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Pelissero, Holian, and Tomaka 2000) -I chose the more consistently available series: city general expenditures per capita.
8 Cities' structural profiles and fiscal information were constructed from the annual issues of The Municipal Year Book published by the International City/ County Management Association. The explanatory variables employed in this study are, again, those typically evinced in the reformism debates-percentage city population black, percentage city population foreign born, and number of manufacturing establishments located within the city (per capita)-and culled from various census reports.
Given the multiwave panel design, in principle, I could treat each record for each city as a distinct observation and estimate an ordinary least squares model that includes a vector of N -1 city-specific dummy variables. However, doing so would require specifying 221 city-specific dummy variablesa rather inefficient strategy. More important, of course, is the concern that collinearity would prevent me from including city-specific dummy variables and city-specific time-invariant explanatory variables (for example, regional location) in the models to be estimated. In contrast, the more efficient alternative that circumvents the need for city-specific dummy variables is the "deviation from means" approach, wherein one transforms each time-varying factor in the model. 9 The transformation involves subtracting for each variable at each point in time the city-specific mean for that variable over time. 
FIXED VERSUS RANDOM EFFECTS
Typically, estimating pooled cross-sectional time-series data requires us to test what are formally referred to as fixed-effects models against their random-effects counterparts.
10 Whereas fixed-effects models are premised on the notion that all unmeasured factors influencing the dependent variable are adequately characterized by the random error term, the random-effects model is predicated on the notion that the residuals consist of three components: unit-specific but time-invariant effects, time-specific but unit-invariant effects, and unit-specific and time-variant effects.
Random-effects models also assume that all unmeasured factors are uncorrelated with the measured predictor variables. With reference to the case of reformism and fiscal flows, this assumption would hold if the stable, albeit unmeasured, characteristics of cities are on average identical across the two groups of cities-reformed versus unreformed. However, because most cities are not randomly assigned to a particular structure but instead choose their form of government based on state laws as well as city-specific socioeconomic and political characteristics, this assumption is unlikely to hold true. It therefore becomes important to control for all constant, unmeasured differences between cities and in this regard the fixed-effects estimator is nearly always preferable to the random-effects estimator (see Allison 1994, 180-82 ; but see also Hsiao 1999, 41-45) .
If naïve theory does not allow us to a priori choose between the fixed-and the random-effects specifications, we can rely upon two statistical tests-the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test and the Hausman test (Hsiao 1999) . Assuming the model is correctly specified, large values of the Breusch-Pagan test statistic suggest the presence of, and hence the need to control for, unobserved city-specific effects. A statistically significant Hausman test statistic indicates likely correlation between the random effects and the independent variables and thus that the fixed-effects specification is the preferred model.
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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION: REFORM AND FISCAL BEHAVIOR
With an eye on Occam's razor and motivated by the desire to replicate past models of form of government effects, I start my inquiry by assuming an immediate, permanent impact of structural change on per-capita expenditures. With reference to Figure 1 , this is akin to modeling the process depicted in (A). Results from this analysis are presented in column 1 of Table 1 . From here, I proceed to test specifications B through F depicted in Figure 1 and report resulting estimates in separate columns of Tables 1 through 3.   406 URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW / January 2003 Although for each substantive model I estimate both fixed effects and random effects, I report and discuss only the fixed-effects estimates because both the substantive reasoning previously discussed and the Hausman specification test statistics consistently emphasize the fixed-effects estimator over its random-effects counterpart.
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As is evident from the estimates reported in Table 1 , model 1 specifies an abrupt-permanent effect of council-manager adoption on per-capita city general expenditures.
13 The positive and highly significant impact of a change in form of government indicates that reformism leads to increased rather than decreased spending (see also Brown and Halaby 1984) . This is an especially noteworthy result because it holds despite our reliance on the "deviation from means" specification that, as I argued in the foregoing pages, explicitly Ruhil / STRUCTURE AND FISCAL FLOW 407 accommodates unmeasured, city-specific idiosyncratic effects. The contradictory result, then, most likely stems from our failure to model the temporal nature of the data-the general tendency of per-capita expenditures to fluctuate over time. 14 Accounting for this expenditure trend (see model 2) nearly halves the coefficients of not only the event indicator but also those on the socioeconomic variables while also driving the coefficient on per-capita manufacturing establishments to statistical insignificance. 15 Most important, however, is the change in the sign on the council-manager variable in model 2, now suggesting that despite the general tendency of per-capita expenditures to increase over time, cities adopting the council-manager form 408 URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW / January 2003 subsequently spend less on average than mayor-council cities. Except for larger coefficients on the event indicator, the estimates of model 3 are generally similar to those of model 2 and indicate no reversal in spending patterns pre-and postchange in form of government. The specification of model 4 allows for possible nonlinearities in fiscal flows: Do expenditure patterns decrease (increase) following adoption of council-manager government only to increase (decrease) over time? Specifically, this model attempts to capture this dynamic through inclusion of the square of the time variable and an interaction between this variable and the event indicator itself. The significance levels and signs on the coefficients of the event and the time variables allude to the likelihood that although adoption of council-manager government does lead a city to spend relatively less than was the norm in its mayor-council past, spending patterns return to what is typical (i.e., average) for the city a few years following structural change.
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This is an intriguing and heretofore undocumented effect. For the better part of the twentieth century, several states required cities to periodically vote (at one-, two-, three-or four-year intervals) on retention of the new form of government (Bromage 1954 ; see also Stene and Floro 1953) . As it were, changing the form of government was never an easy accomplishment, requiring those favoring change to expend considerable time and energy in effecting change (Gordon 1968) . Efficiency was, as much then as now, the rallying cry of council-manager supporters who were not above citing anecdotal evidence of decreased tax rates and other indicators as proof of the benefits to be had from the council-manager form (Hayes 1972) . Fearing a loss in subsequent elections unless they had something to show for it, incoming administrations most likely pursued reduced spending-the easiest, most visible and comprehensible measure of efficiency. Hayes (1972) , for example, highlights the decision made by Oakland's first city manager to cut city employees'pay and use the savings to reduce the tax rates on business and residential property. Such drastic deviations from baseline taxing and spending patterns are obviously difficult to sustain for long especially if city-manager governments seek urban growth and development strategies. When the much-promised financial savings and tax reductions failed to materialize or long-overdue tax assessments were finally levied, irate citizens voted to revert city government to the mayor-council form (Bromage 1954; Stene and Floro 1953) .
In Table 2 , I report the estimates of two fixed-effects models that specify variants of immediate and delayed effects of changes in form of government. The delayed impacts pertain to effects that last for one, two, and three years following the first year the council-manager government is in effect. Note that these theoretical effects are coded such that their impact does not last beyond the year in which they manifest themselves.
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The first model (model 5A) tests for delayed impacts of the switch to council-manager government by excluding an immediate and permanent impact (council-manager (t) ). The second model (model 5B), however, includes council-manager (t) and thus tests for both immediate and delayed impacts. As is evident in Table 2 , neither specification of council-manager effects is statistically significant. 18 Finally, in Table 3 I report the estimates from various specifications that include delayed, albeit permanent, effects. In particular, although the first specification (model 6A) tests for a lagged effect of reformism that manifests itself one year after the event occurs, the second specification (model 6B) specifies an effect that occurs with a two-year lag, and the third specification (model 6C) attempts to discern a three-year lagged effect.
19 Each lag may represent a variety of postreform changes in city's governmental organization as, for example, the hiring of a city manager or the shuffling of department heads and line officers; such internal reorganization needs time. The fourth specification (model 6D) encompasses the first three models while also including an immediate effect of change in form of government.
Although in the first three specifications the event indicators are significant and have the hypothesized sign, only the event indicator specifying an immediate effect is significant in the final specification (see model 6D). This suggests the absence of any delayed effects that supplement the immediate effect. Higher-order lags would be required to test processes influenced by the event after lengthier delays.
Given that the analysis covers a wide range of possible institutional effects, it becomes necessary to choose between the alternative scenarios. A useful criterion, and one familiar to students of linear regression analysis, is the goodness-of-fit measure-the R 2 . A cursory review of the R 2 for each model reveals near-identical goodness-of-fit statistics for all models except model 1, which has the lowest R 2 (0.3934). This ought not to be surprising because we know model 1 is misspecified in the sense that we have estimated model 1 while ignoring the panel structure of the data. Consequently, we may eliminate model 1 from further consideration. The models reported in Table 2 can likewise be eliminated because the event indicators capturing temporary, delayed impacts fail to achieve significance. Of the remaining specifications, model 4 has a marginally higher R 2 than does model 2. To sum up, the diagnostics underscore a superior fit of the model suggesting a temporary decrease in per-capita expenditures post-structural change.
UNPACKING THE BLACK BOX OF REFORMISM
VIA ANALYTIC METHOD AND THEORY
The study of reformism has a long-standing history of conflicting evidence vis-à-vis the spending patterns of council-manager versus mayorcouncil governments. My analysis reveals that cities adopting council-manager government do experience decreased per-capita expenditures; however, these decreases, far from being permanent shifts, dissipate over time. In particular, cities adopting the council-manager form of government are found to return to their prechange spending patterns after a 14-year abeyance. This is an important finding that has heretofore gone unnoticed and is worthy of further scrutiny. Given the recent trend in favor of the mayor-council form, it remains to be seen whether this reversal of institutional effects is limited to municipal spending per se or applies more generally to other local processes as well. For example, the present analysis is restricted to levels of municipal expenditure and tells us nothing about whether structural change affects budgeting priorities and the city's mix of on-and off-budget enterprises. Nor does it tell us how cities achieve the brief period of decreased expenditures that follow a switch to council-manager government. Are capital projects delayed and low-priority programs cut back, as often occurs with fiscal crises (see Rubin 1998)? These intriguing questions merit careful examination.
This article also demonstrates the value added from modeling dynamic urban phenomena with suitable data and estimation techniques. Specifically, if the data represent a pool of cities observed for consecutive time periods, employing appropriate panel data estimators can reveal far more about the intricacies of urban political processes and outcomes than has been the case thus far. Indeed, a pooled cross-sectional time-series design has much to recommend it. First, over time data enable us to test dynamic behavior that cannot be analyzed reliably and efficiently in a static setting (see also Lyons 1978) . More specifically, this research design allows us to investigate whether the impacts of substantively intriguing events are immediate, delayed, permanent, or transitory in nature.
Second, because our empirical models at best only approximate the rich tapestry that is urban politics in America, it is invariably difficult to ignore the problem of model misspecification. What if there exist city-specific characteristics that we have omitted from our models either because our theories have yet to uncover all the true components of urban phenomena or because we are missing data? Both situations have severe implications for our analyses unless we account for the potential influence of unmeasured characteris-tics. Fortunately, the fixed-effects and random-effects estimators discussed in this study enable us to recover unbiased estimates in the face of otherwise intractable situations. In particular, the "deviation from means" approach that underlies the fixed-and the random-effects estimators is a powerful antidote to such arguments precisely because it allows cities to retain their uniqueness while nevertheless yielding parameter estimates that describe how a particular set of hypothesized factors lead urban processes or outcomes to deviate, on average, from everyday patterns.
Finally, the general methodological framework applied in this study has much to recommend it because it is potentially applicable to the study of various substantive questions of interest to students of urban politics. For example, a similar framework applies equally well to studies focused on how changes in mayoral leadership affect local policy priorities or whether minority incorporation (defined as the election of a minority mayor) alters a city's spending priorities (see, for example, Pelissero, Holian, and Tomaka 2000) . More important, the general analytic approach applies equally well to behaviors or outcomes measured as categorical variables (Allison 1994, 193-95) . A bivariate probit model, for instance, might be the preferred option if the research goal is to model choice of municipal service delivery options or annexation decisions as a function of form of government and other causal factors. Failure to employ a suitable method will, however, only lead to premature calls for a theoretical rethink (see, for example, Stumm and Corrigan 1998) .
NOTES
1. In addition to formal structure, the informal governing regime peculiar to each city has critical implications for local policy as well (see Stone 1989 Stone , 1993 . Although in principle the analytic framework developed in this article is applicable to the study of urban regimes, this undertaking is beyond the scope of the present research for two reasons. First, because there is currently no operational definition of urban regimes, considerable time and energy would need to be devoted not only to developing valid and reliable measurements but also to compiling data on urban regimes for multiple cities for multiple years. Second, because the focus of this study is on municipal expenditures, which are less directly influenced by a city's informal governing regime, formal governing arrangements are theoretically relevant for this inquiry.
2. But see Lyons (1978) for a dynamic exploration of institutional effects. 3. Paul Allison (1994) developed the fundamental logic of statistical inquiry I employ in this study.
4. It is, of course, debatable how one ought to operationalize reformism. Most scholars rely on additive scales that include a city's form of government, use of partisan or nonpartisan elections, and reliance upon at-large or district elections (see Bridges and Kronick 1999; Morgan and Pelissero 1980) . Additive reform indices are, however, controversial; see Lyons (1977) for details.
5. Although I anchor my critical evaluation of past model of reformism with reference to Morgan and Pelissero's (1980) work, I do so because they were one of the few urban scholars to move beyond static analyses in a time when the social sciences were only beginning to understand the intricacies of dynamic econometric analysis. Regrettably, however, few have followed Morgan and Pelissero's lead in studying urban politics in a dynamic empirical setting.
6. Past researchers analyzing the causes and consequences of structural reform have not only used subsets of these 309 cities per se but also relied on 1960s data. Hence, sampling variability cannot explain differences between the results of this study and those reported in the extant literature (see Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Lyons 1978; Morgan and Pelissero 1980) . I also restrict my analyses to the 1946 to 1966 period because reliable data on form of government changes are unavailable post-1966. 7. Certainly, during the 1946 to 1966 period some cities may have adopted commission government. However, absent reliable data on post-1928 commission adoptions, these events cannot be incorporated into the analysis. Because commission cities tend to comprise fewer than 5% of all cities in the nation, the potential loss of information is likely negligible. All adoptions are treated as nonrepeatable events. That is, cities abandoning, for example, the council-manager form of government for the mayor-council or commission form only to readopt the council-manager form later are excluded from analysis.
8. Because per-capita expenditures are the analytic focus of this study, it is useful to ask whether budgeting, and therefore expenditure patterns, is likely to differ across forms of government. That is, could it be that mayor-council cities rely upon off-budget enterprises more or less heavily than do council-manager cities? If relative use of on-and off-budget enterprises is dissimilar across governing structure, focusing on per-capita general expenditures alone may fail to capture true expenditure flows over time. However, research suggests that mayor-council cities are no more likely to use nonguaranteed debt than are council-manager cities (see Clingermayer and Feiock 2001) . Indeed, cities-regardless of governmental form-are typically drawn to offbudget enterprises because these entities allow cities to evade restrictions on government borrowing by states or voters or both (Bennett and DiLorenzo 1983) .
9. In principle, this method yields coefficients identical to those produced by least squares dummy variables approach.
10. If we have reason to believe that the data structure is far more complicated, we might employ feasible generalized least squares estimators that allow for serial (i.e., errors for a particular city are correlated over time) or spatial (i.e., errors for a city are correlated with errors for every other city in the sample) correlation, heteroscedasticity, or some combination thereof. Various factors can give rise to one or all of these complications. Specification bias, cyclical behavior, and data manipulation are some of the common sources of serial correlation. We might expect spatially correlated errors, however, if shared (albeit unmeasured) forces lead all cities to behave identically. Given a sample of reasonable size, such complicated data structures can be easily absorbed by most software routines available in the market these days. See also Allison (1994) and Beck and Katz (1995) .
11. To be sure, a critical assumption for the reliable estimation of fixed-effects and randomeffects models is that our substantive models are correctly specified. If our theoretical models are misspecified, tests for the presence of random effects are likely to be invalid.
12. The random-effects estimates of each fixed-effects model discussed in the text are available upon request.
13. The council-manager variable is coded as 1 for all years starting with the year the council-manager government goes into effect and 0 for all preceding years. This coding convention applies for models 1 through 4.
14. Net of all other causal factors, we should a priori expect expenditures to increase because the general trend has been for city expenditures to increase over time.
15. In passing, note that although cities with greater proportions of foreign born spend relatively less per capita, a relatively larger black presence in the city is associated with greater percapita expenditures.
16. Net of all other factors, the cumulative impact of adopting council-manager government is measured by -29.5669X + 2.9050Xt -0.1004Xt 2 . Taking the partial derivative of this expression with respect to time and solving for the number of years at which all institutional effects dissipate yields an illustrative estimate of a little more than 14 years. Note that this is an out-of-sample forecast and must be interpreted cautiously. 17. The council-manager (t) variable is coded 1 for the first year council-manager government is in effect and 0 for all other years. The other three council-manager variables in Table 2 are coded 1 in the first, second, and third years following the year the form of government change is in effect and 0 for all other years. Of course, we could include additional suitably coded dummy variables if we suspect further delayed impacts. Note, however, that in a short panel only a limited number of such dummy variables may be included before perfect collinearity (between these period indicators and the temporal counter) starts to impede estimation.
18. I also estimated four distinct models, each with only one of the four event indicators (shown in Table 2 ) specified. No model yielded statistically significant event indicators.
19. The council-manager (t + i)* variables are coded 1 starting one, two, and three years following the year council-manager government is in effect and 0 otherwise.
